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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD WEBB, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation, WILLIAM REAGAN, 
individually, and DOUGLAS T. 
HALL, individually, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Supreme Court No. 870360 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
This is an action arising out of plaintiff's demand to 
examine the books and records of R.O.A. General, Inc. (hereinafter 
"R.O.A.") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47 (1953). This appeal 
is taken from the August 28, 1987, Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
presiding, denying plaintiff-appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and granting defendant-respondents', R.O.A. and William 
Reagan, Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court's 
Order of August 28, 1987 has been certified as a final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
Court has appellate jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(i). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the exercise of defendant R.O.A.fs option to 
purchase plaintiff's stock terminate plaintiff's status as a 
"stockholder" within the purview of Utah Code Ann, §16-10-47 (1953)? 
2. Did the plaintiff contract away his statutory right to 
inspect R.O.A.'s books and records under the stock purchase 
agreement? 
3. Did plaintiff demand to inspect R.O.A.'s books and 
records at a reasonable time and for a proper purpose as required 
under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(d) (1953)? 
4. Even if the trial court committed error, is plaintiff 
entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law on his claims 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47 (1953)? 
5. Does Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1953) provide for 
the recovery of multiple statutory penalties under the facts of the 
instant case? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-2(15) (1953), §16-10-47(b) and (c) 
(1953); and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure determine 
the outcome of this appeal. Due to the length of these provisions, 
the text of each is set forth in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an action by plaintiff to compel 
defendants R.O.A. and Reagan to produce the corporate books and 
records of R.O.A. for inspection pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10-47(b) (1953). Plaintiff also seeks to recover the statutory 
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penalties imposed under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1953) for 
defendants1 alleged multiple wrongful refusals to allow such 
examinations. 
Plaintiff and his wife, Bessie Webb, formerly owned stock 
in R.O.A. as joint tenants. (R. at 2, 80, 84, 89, 90, 130, 517) 
On July 7, 1981, plaintiff and Bessie Webb (hereinafter the 
"Webbs"), and William Reagan (hereinafter "Reagan"), executed a 
written agreement (hereinafter the "Agreement"), forming R.O.A., a 
Utah corporation. (R. at 62-78) Pursuant to the Agreement, Reagan 
obtained 80% of the stock of R.O.A. and the Webbs acquired the 
balance of the stock. (R. at 34, 203, 274) 
Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Agreement, R.O.A. had the 
right to purchase all of the Webbs' stock. (R. at 71-72) In order 
to exercise such right, R.O.A. was only required to provide notice 
of the purchase within 6 months after August 1, 1986. (R. at 71-72) 
Pursuant to the Agreement, the purchase price of the Webbs' stock 
was to be set and determined by an independent appraisal. (R. at 
62-78) The terms of payment for the Webbs' stock were also 
determined in the Agreement. (R. at 71-74) Following notice of 
R.O.A.'s election to purchase their stock, the Webbs were 
contractually required to obtain an initial independent appraisal 
of the stock's value. (R. at 72) 
Plaintiff served as a director of R.O.A. beginning on 
August 1, 1981. (R. at 35, 80) During the period of his 
employment as a director of R.O.A. and for so long as the Webbs 
were stockholders, plaintiff maintained an office at R.O.A.'s 
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corporate headquarters and had access to the books and records of 
R.O.A. Plaintiff, in fact, periodically reviewed R.O.A.fs books 
and records. (R. at 158, 178-81, 287) 
On or about March 5, 1985, the Webbs, by and through their 
accountant, Duane E. Karren, made demand upon R.O.A. to formally 
inspect its corporate books and records. (R. at 190-94) Pursuant 
to the Webbs1 request, R.O.A. made its books and records available 
for inspection. Mr. Karren subsequently inspected R.O.A.!s books 
and records. (R. at 191) 
By letter dated January 27, 1987, R.O.A. gave notice to 
the Webbs of its exercise of its purchase option. (R. at 43, 78A, 
207, 280, 484, 508) 
On April 20, 1987, plaintiff informed R.O.A. and Reagan 
that he intended to exercise his statutory right to inspect the 
books and records of R.O.A. (R. at 53, 485) The April 20, 1987 
demand was made solely by plaintiff. The demand did not include a 
similar request from Bessie Webb, the joint owner of the Webbs' 
share. The demand did not state the purpose of the proposed 
examination. (R. at 53) 
Plaintiff's April 20 demand was received at R.O.A. 
headquarters while Reagan was out of the country. R.O.A. informed 
plaintiff that Reagan would be out of the country until May 18, 
1987. R.O.A. requested that plaintiff renew his demand once Reagan 
returned. (R. at 54, 485) R.O.A. also informed plaintiff that 
recent personnel changes in R.O.A.'s accounting department would 
make such an inspection extremely difficult for R.O.A. to respond 
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to immediately. R.O.A. also indicated that plaintiff would need to 
clarify his demand in order to facilitate production of the desired 
records. (R. at 54) 
Plaintiff's accountant, Mr. Karren, on or about May 18, 
1987, more specifically set out the records he sought to inspect. 
The May 18 letter indicated that the desired examination was to be 
substantially similar to Mr. Karren!s prior examination of R.O.A.fs 
records. (R. at 55-56) The letter did not set a date for 
examination of the records. 
Much of the information requested in the May 18 letter 
required R.O.A. to expend considerable time and effort to comply 
with the request. Plaintiff's May 18 request required defendant to 
do far more than simply open its books for inspection. Plaintiff 
specifically demanded that R.O.A. assemble various summaries and 
explanations of certain business transactions. (R. at 55-56) 
On May 20, 1987, plaintiff made demand upon R.O.A. through 
a new agent, Attorney Victoria E. Brieant. The May 20 demand 
stated that Attorney Brieant and others would be present at 10:00 
a.m. on May 27, 1987, at the offices of R.O.A. to examine the 
corporate records. (R. at 57, 93) Plaintiff made no effort to 
arrange a mutually convenient time to conduct the investigation. 
Attorney Brieant's May 20 demand also indicated that she 
intended to use "our accountants, Peat, Marwick & Mitchell . . . ." 
Ms. Brieantfs demand also alluded to the need for an appraisal. 
The demand did not specify, however, whether the requested 
examination would be used in the appraisal of the Webbs' stock as 
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required under the Agreement. (R. at 57) 
Defendants R.O.A. and Reagan responded to plaintiff's 
demand by requesting several concessions: First, that R.O.A. be 
given sufficient time to prepare for the examination; second, that 
the examination be conducted in accordance with the Agreement's 
appraisal process; third, that the confidentiality of R.O.A-fs 
trade secrets and financial information be maintained, and lastly, 
that the inspection be done in an orderly fashion so as to minimize 
disruption of R.O.A.'s ongoing business. (R. at 58, 94) 
In May, 1987, Richard Brooks, a key employee in R.O.A.'s 
accounting department, terminated his employment. Mr. Brooks' 
absence left R.O.A. shorthanded, thereby making it extremely 
difficult for R.O.A. to promptly prepare the requested summaries 
and reports. (R. at 54, 178-81, 287) 
On May 26, 1987, a letter was hand-delivered to 
plaintiff's counsel from defendants' counsel, William H. Adams. 
Mr. Adams explained that R.O.A.fs records would be made available 
for examination by plaintiff or his agents in accordance with the 
appraisal rights accorded plaintiff under the Agreement. Adams 
indicated that it would be unreasonable to expect R.O.A. to assume 
the burden of multiple examinations by parties other than plaintiff's 
designated appraiser. (R. at 58) 
Despite prior indications by plaintiff's counsel that a 
Mr. Donald Sutte had been appointed to render an appraisal of the 
value of the Webbs' stock, plaintiff's counsel and various other 
individuals from Peat, Marwick & Mitchell arrived at R.O.A. 
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headquarters on the morning of May 27, 1987, (R. at 37, 38, 57, 
93, 94, 102) While plaintiff's counsel was at R.O.A. corporate 
headquarters, defendants' counsel, William H. Adams, notifed her 
that an inspection of R.O.A.'s records would not be permitted on 
that date. (R. at 37, 38, 93, 94, 102) 
On May 29, 1987, plaintiff filed suit against R.O.A., 
Reagan and others, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County. Plaintiff sought damages from R.O.A. for alleged 
breach of an employment contract. In addition, plaintiff sought 
injunctive relief and statutory damages against R.O.A., Reagan and 
others for their alleged wrongful refusal to permit plaintiff to 
inspect the corporate records of R.O.A. (R. at 2-9) 
On June 3, 1987, plaintiff once again made demand to 
inspect the books and records of R.O.A. (R. at 59-60) Plaintiff's 
counsel indicated that the inspection would take place beginning at 
10:00 a.m. on June 5, 1987. 
By letter dated June 4, 1987, defendants' counsel advised 
plaintiff's counsel that R.O.A. would make its employees available 
to assist plaintiff's inspection beginning June 15, 1987. (R. at 
61) Counsel was also informed that the inspection would take place 
only upon the condition that the individuals examining the records 
would be required to sign a confidentiality agreement prior to 
beginning their inspection. (R. at 61) 
On June 15, 1987, when plaintiff's attorney and several 
unidentified persons appeared at the office of R.O.A., Ms. Brieant 
refused to permit any of the parties to execute the confidentiality 
-7-
agreement. Ms. Brieant also refused to comply with the other 
conditions R.O.A. had placed upon plaintiff's inspection of the 
records as set forth in R.O.A.fs prior correspondence to plaintiff. 
(R. at 288) As a result, R.O.A. and Reagan declined to permit 
Ms. Brieant and the others access to R.O.A.fs records. (R. at 96) 
On June 15, 1987, plaintiff filed his first Amended 
Complaint, seeking additional statutory damages due to the refusal 
of R.O.A. and Reagan "on three separate occasions" to permit 
inspection of R.O.A.fs records. (R. at 33-47) 
One week after filing the Amended Complaint, plaintiff 
moved for partial summary judgment. (R. at 111-12) Plaintiff's 
motion was supported by various affidavits. (R. at 89-97) On 
June 26, 1987, defendants R.O.A. and Reagan filed cross-motions for 
partial summary judgment. (R. at 128-29, 185-86) Defendants' 
cross-motions for partial summary judgment were also supported by 
various affidavits. (R. at 156-58, 178-81) 
On August 28, 1987, the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, The Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, denied 
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and granted 
defendant's cross-motions for summary judgment. (R. at 344-45) 
It is from the August 28, 1987, Order that plaintiff now appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A SHAREHOLDER WITHIN THE 
PURVIEW OF UTAH CODE ANN. §16-10-47 (1953). 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) (1953) codifies the common law 
rule recognized in Clawson v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 93 P. 729 
(1908), that a shareholder has the right to inspect corporate books 
and records at a reasonable time and for a reasonable purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) (1953) provides: 
Any person who is a shareholder of record, upon 
written demand stating the purpose thereof, 
will have the right to examine, in person, or 
by agent or attorney, at any reasonable time or 
times, for any proper purpose, its books and 
records of account, minutes and record of 
shareholders and to make extracts therefrom. 
A proper purpose means a purpose reasonably 
related to the person's interest as a share-
holder. 
A "shareholder" is further defined under Utah law as "one who is a 
holder of record of shares in a corporation." Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10-2(15) (1953) . 
The purchase option given to R.O.A. under the Agreement 
was essentially a continuing irrevocable offer of sale by the 
Webbs which could not be withdrawn during the stated period. The 
purchase option vested in R.O.A. a power of acceptance. The 
Agreement contemplated that once R.O.A. accepted the Webbs' offer 
in the prescribed manner, a binding bilateral contract of sale 
would be created. 1A Corbin On Contracts §§259, 260, 264 (1963 
ed.); 1 Williston On Contracts §§25, 61A-D (3d ed.); 17 Am.Jur.2d 
Contracts §32 (1964); and 77 C.J.S. Sales §33(d) (1952). 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Ollie v. Rainbolt, 66 9 P.2d 
275 (Okla. 1983), acknowledged the binding and conclusive effect of 
the exercise of a purchase option. In Ollie, various aggrieved 
stockholders brought suit claiming the defendants had violated the 
terms of a stock purchase agreement. The Oklahoma court noted the 
difference between a right of first refusal agreement and a 
purchase option agreement, stating: 
The agreements in suit expressly state that they 
grant "not an option, but rather the right of 
first refusal to buy all of the stock" of the 
selling shareholders. To properly construe 
these agreements, we must inquire into the nature 
of the preemptive right, and the legal obligations 
arising thereunder. 
A right of first refusal has been described as 
closely related in purpose to options and yet 
very dissimilar in other respects. An option is 
essentially a continuing and irrevocable offer 
by the optioner, which cannot be withdrawn by 
him during the stated period. It vests in the 
optionee what is usually termed a power of 
acceptance, and when he accepts the offer in 
the prescribed manner, the option is deemed to 
have been exercised so as to create a binding 
bilateral contract. A right of first refusal, 
on the other hand, is distinguished from an 
option. Because it is not an offer, it 
can create no power of acceptance. The right 
of preemption does not give to its holder the 
power to compel an unwilling owner to sell. 
Id. at 279 (emphasis added). 
By exercising its purchase option on January 27, 1987, 
R.O.A. accepted the plaintiff's offer of sale. Under such an option 
agreement, the optionor is bound to perform. Upon exercise of the 
option, title passes and the stock must be delivered. 1 Williston 
On Contracts §61B (3d ed.). Therefore, once the purchase option 
was exercised by R.O.A., plaintiff and Bessie Webb were obligated 
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to comply with the Agreement by obtaining an appraisal and 
tendering their stock to R.O.A. See, Colorado Management Corp. v. 
American Founders Life Ins. Co., 148 Colo. 519, 367 P.2d 335 
(1961). In accordance with the terms of the July 7, 1981 Agreement 
and R.O.A.fs exercise of the purchase option provided therein on 
January 27, 1987, plaintiff ceased to be a shareholder in R.O.A. on 
January 27, 1987. As a result, plaintiff had no statutory right to 
inspect R.O.A.fs books and records any time after January 27, 1987. 
The Supreme Court of New York in In Re Gaines, 180 N.Y.S. 
191 (1919), afffd, 190 App.Div. 941, 179 N.Y.S. 922 (1920), found 
under similar facts that a shareholder had lost her statutory right 
of inspection. In Gaines, plaintiff brought suit to examine certain 
corporate records. Plaintiff instituted the action claiming that 
her deceased father was the recordholder of 50 shares of stock in 
the corporation, and that under his will she was entitled to the 
stock. The defendant corporation denied that plaintiff was a 
shareholder on the ground that she had entered into a binding 
contract to sell her interest in the stock. 
The court noted that the plaintiff's contract to sell the 
stock was in full force and effect and the purchasing party was not 
in default. The court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff did 
not have standing to inspect the corporate records: 
From the facts it appears the petitioner has 
only a contingent interest in the stock that 
is temporarily registered in her name, and 
that all the elements of a contract of absolute 
sale are present. The mere fact that the stock 
is registered in petitioner's name does not 
constitute her a stockholder in the sense 
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necessary to entitle her to maintain this 
proceeding. 
Id. at 192 (citations omitted). 
Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff and his wife were and 
are bound to transfer their stock to R.O.A. Exercise of the 
purchase option by R.O.A. created a binding bilateral contract 
enforceable through specific performance. While the plaintiff1s 
stock remains temporarily registered in his name, all the elements 
of a binding contract of absolute sale are present. The mere fact 
that the stock is registered in his name does not mean that he is a 
"shareholder" within the purview of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b). 
Plaintiff1s attempt to claim the status of a shareholder 
by failing to comply with his obligations under the Agreement 
cannot give him greater rights than he is entitled to under the 
Agreement. When a contract contemplates action on behalf of a 
party, he cannot absolve himself of liability by failing or 
refusing to take the required action. Caldeira v. Sokei, 49 Hawaii 
317, 417 P.2d 823 (1966). It is axiomatic that a person cannot 
breach a contract and then use his failure of performance to assert 
rights against a non-breaching party. 
Defendant R.O.A. properly exercised its purchase option in 
accordance with the Agreement. By so doing, R.O.A. accepted the 
plaintiff's offer of sale in the prescribed manner, thereby 
creating a binding bilateral contract. R.O.A. stands ready and 
willing to perform under the terms of the Agreement. R.O.A. 
awaits only for the plaintiff to fulfill his obligations under the 
Agreement. R.O.A. was entitled to delivery of plaintiff's shares 
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as of July 27, 1987. Title to the shares vested in defendant 
R.O.A. on July 27, 1987, Therefore, plaintiff should not be 
accorded the rights of a shareholder under Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10-47(b). 
Plaintiff asserts that he must be deemed to be a 
"shareholder," due to the fact that he has not been paid for his 
stock. The Agreement does not provide that payment is a condition 
precedent to the formation of a binding bilateral contract of sale. 
In fact, if the appraiser determines the stock to be valueless, 
there would be no need for payment. The issue of payment is 
irrelevant. The sole question that must be determined is whether 
the contract of sale was in full force and effect and that there 
had been no default on the part of R.O.A. at the time the option 
was exercised. Gaines, 180 N.Y.S. at 192. The passing of title 
is not predicated upon payment of the purchase price. 12A Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §5628 (rev. perm, 
ed. 1972). 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy 
Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241 (1967), held that title 
to stock may be transferred pursuant to a purchase agreement before 
payment has been received. Tracy arose from an agreement whereby 
the plaintiff agreed to sell his stock in the defendant corporation 
in consideration for installment payments secured by a chattel 
mortgage on certain corporate equipment. Plaintiff endorsed his 
stock certificates in blank and delivered the stock to defendant. 
The corporation thereafter desposited the shares in escrow. When 
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the corporation defaulted on the installment payments, plaintiff 
foreclosed on the equipment. Following an award of damages in the 
foreclosure proceeding, defendant appealed. 
In affirming the trial court's award of damages, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals considered whether the parties' 
agreement transferred title of the stock from plaintiff to the 
defendant corporation. The Minnesota court held: 
It is clear to us that the agreement of July 31, 
1959, served to transfer the title of the stock 
owned by plaintiff to defendant corporation. 
See, Minn. St. 301.02 Susbd. 7; Wolff v. Heidritter 
Lbr. Co., 112 N.J. Eq. 34, 163 A. 140; Beal v. 
Essex Sav. Bank (C.C.D. Mass. (67 F. 816)). 
Tracy, 153 N.W.2d at 245. See also, Currey v. Willard Steam 
Service, 321 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1958) (under terms of contact of sale 
plaintiff was not entitled to any share of dividends accrued after 
entering contract of sale, even though the full purchase price had 
not been paid). 
Plaintiff likewise contends that the passing of title is 
dependent upon actual delivery of his stock certificate. It is 
well established that actual delivery of the certificate is not 
necessarily essential to the passing of title. 12A Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §5626 (rev. perm. ed. 
1972). One noted treatise states: 
In preceding sections, it is pointed out that a 
stockholder is one who owns stock in a corporation, 
and that a certificate of stock is not the stock 
itself, but merely the written evidence of the 
stockholder's rights as such. It is a necessary 
conclusion therefrom that issuance of a certifi-
cate of stock is not necessary to make one a 
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stockholder. And it is well settled, as a 
general rule of corporation law that . . . a 
purchaser of stock, becomes a stockholder as 
soon as . . . the purchase is completed, as the 
case may be, whether a certificate of stock is 
issued to the purchaser or not; and, although 
the purchaser may have no certificate, the 
purchaser is thereupon entitled to all the 
rights, and is subject to all the liabilities 
of a stockholder. 
* * * 
[W]here an actual sale has been made and the 
title to the stock has passed • . . the purchaser 
is a stockholder though no certificate has been 
issued to the purchaser . . . . 
11 Fletcher Cyclopedia on the Law of Private Corporations §5094 
(rev. perm. ed. 1986) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco 
Polo, 17 Utah 2d 181, 407 P.2d 565 (1965), recognized that stock 
ownership is not dependent upon physical possession of the 
corresponding stock certificates. In Owyhee, the plaintiff sued 
and obtained judgment against Robbins, Inc. Thereafter, plaintiff 
issued a garnishment against a Mr. Luman, contending that he had 
money belonging to Robbins, Inc. Plaintiff claimed that Robbins, 
Inc. had improperly repurchased some of its own stock from Luman, 
thereby impairing its capital. The trial court denied recovery on 
the garnishment. 
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court 
erred in refusing to find that the transaction was a repurchase of 
stock by Robbins, Inc. In affirming the lower court's ruling, the 
Utah Supreme Court noted that possession of a stock certificate is 
merely evidence of stock ownership. Owyhee, 407 P.2d at 567. 
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The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Davies v. Semloh 
Hotel, 86 Utah 318, 44 P.2d 689 (1935), holds that title to stock 
purchased under a binding contract of sale vests at the time the 
contract is entered into. In Davies, the defendant offered 
plaintiff $500 in cash and 27 shares of stock in the J.C. Penney 
Company in return for plaintiff's agreement to work for the 
defendant's hotel. The employment contract also obligated 
plaintiff to purchase 1,600 shares of the capital stock of the 
defendant corporation. In addition, the contract provided that if 
plaintiff was ever fired, the hotel would repurchase the stock at 
the price of $1.00 per share. Plaintiff was employed by defendant 
from July 13, 19 3 3 until August 24, 1933. Immediately following 
his firing, plaintiff demanded payment for his stock. Defendant 
refused. 
At trial, the central issue was whether the plaintiff had 
been discharged. The jury found in favor of plaintiff, and entered 
a judgment for the amount specified in the employment contract for 
the stock. 
On appeal, defendant contended that it was not obligated 
to purchase the stock from plaintiff. The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected the defendant's argument, and affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court. The court stated: 
Under the terms of the contract in the 
instant case, if it was "agreed that if at 
any time the second party should see fit to 
discharge and thus discontinue the services 
of the first party for cause or otherwise, 
then and in that event the second party 
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agrees to repurchase the stock of the second 
party now held by the first party at par 
value of One ($1.00) Dollar per share." 
Under the terms of the contract whether or 
not the property in the stock passed to the 
buyer, the defendant was bound by his 
contract to repurchase and pay for the 
stock . . . . This transaction did not 
contemplate an option on the part of the 
defendant to repurchase the stock, nor did 
it constitute what might be termed an offer 
to purchase the stock. It was a binding 
contract upon both parties subject only to a 
condition subsequent, viz., the discharge of 
the plaintiff from the employment 
contemplated in the contract. The condition 
subsequent having been fulfilled in the 
discharge of the plaintiff and the plaintiff 
having made tender of the stock, there would 
seem to be no good reason why he should not 
recover. It was the clear intention of the 
parties that the title of the stock should 
pass to the defendant upon the happening of 
the events as outlined upon which defendant 
became bound to pay. 
Davies, 44 P.2d at 690-91. (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Taylor v. Paynes, 118 Utah 72, 
218 P.2d 1069 (1950), clearly held that title to stock transfers 
upon the execution of a binding contract of sale, even though 
delivery and endorsement of the shares has not yet taken place. 
Taylor arose out of a dispute between Marvin S. Taylor and J. Fred 
Daynes, both shareholders in the Daynes Optical Company. Soon 
after the optical company was formed, the parties had sharp 
disagreements regarding the operation of the corporation. Taylor 
expressed a desire to sell his stock and discontinue his 
affiliation with the company. On July 20, 1947, the active 
corporate directors met to discuss the purchase of Taylor's stock. 
On Monday, July 21, 1947, Taylor took his stock certificate to the 
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office of defendant. Defendant accepted the stock certificate and 
dictated and signed the following: 
To whom it may concern: This is to advise 
that J. Fred Daynes, John F. Daynes, and 
Lincoln A. Daynes have this day purchased 
from Marvin S. Taylor stock certificate 
number 2, being all of his stock and interest 
in the Daynes Optical Company. Respectfully 
(signed) J. Fred Daynes. 
Defendant kept the stock certificate for several months. 
When plaintiff failed to receive any money for the stock, he took 
back the stock certificate in February, 1948. Plaintiff later 
endorsed and return the stock certificate to defendant. 
On April 22, 1948, plaintiff filed suit against 
defendant, alleging the purchase and sale of his stock certificate 
and claiming $6,000 plus interest as payment for said stock. 
After defendant introduced evidence at trial to support his 
defense, the trial court found that the defendant had purchased 
the stock certificate on July 21, 1947, and entered judgment in 
favor of plaintiff. 
On appeal, the defendant contended that there could not 
have been a sale on July 21, 1947, since existing Utah law 
prohibited the consummation of a stock sale prior to the time the 
stock certificate was endorsed. The Utah Supreme Court squarely 
rejected the defendant's argument, and stated: 
We are of the opinion that the contract as 
established is not executory, but is a 
contract of present purchase and sale. This 
court, in the case of Jones v. Commercial 
Investment Trust, 64 Utah 151, at page 163, 
228 P. 896, at page 900, discussed the 
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differences between a sale and a contract to 
sell. Woolley, District Judge, speaking for 
this court, explained the distinction as 
follows: 
A sale involves a present transfer of 
the title in the goods from the seller 
to the buyer. A contract to sell 
implies that the title in the goods 
remains vested in the seller and is to 
be transferred to the buyer at some 
future time. Whether a contract is one 
of sale or an executory contract to 
sell depends always upon what the 
parties to it intend in regard to the 
time when the title in the property is 
to go to the buyer. If they intend the 
title to be transferred when the 
contract is made, it is a contract of 
sale; otherwise it is a contract to 
sell. The intention of the parties is 
the important and controlling fact to 
be considered and given effect in 
determining the nature of a contract in 
this regard. There may be a sale, a 
present passing of the title, 
notwithstanding that by the terms of 
the agreement the right to the 
possession of the thing sold is 
retained by the seller until the 
purchase price is paid. The intention 
must be determined from a consideration 
of the nature and terms of the 
contract, usages of trade, the conduct 
of the parties, and the circumstances 
of the case. If no contrary intention 
appears from such a consideration, then 
the law presumes, where the contract 
pertains to a specific chattel, in a 
deliverable state, that the parties 
intend the title to pass when the 
contract is made, and this is true 
regardless of the fact that payment of 
the price or delivery of the goods, or 
both, be postponed. 
Taylor, 218 P.2d at 1072 (emphasis in original). 
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Utah 
Supreme Court cited with approval its earlier decision in Davies 
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v. Semioh Hotel, Inc., 86 Utah 318, 44 P.2d 689 (1935). In 
holding that title to the stock had vested in the defendant, 
thereby obligating him to pay for the stock, the Taylor court stated: 
This being an action to recover the contract 
price of $6,000 and the trial court having 
found that the contract was one of immediate 
purchase, the time of indorsement is not 
material to appellant's liability so long as 
the indorsement is made upon tender of the 
purchase price. If, on July 21, 1947, the 
appellant obligated himself to pay for the 
purchase price of this stock, then the mere 
fact that transfer was not made would not 
defeat respondent's right to recover. 
* * * 
The appellant acquired an interest in 
the stock certificate on July 21, 1947, and 
should not escape paying therefor. 
Taylor, 218 P.2d at 1073-74 (emphasis added). 
Cases from other jurisdictions, dealing with the issue of 
whether a stockholder retains a right of inspection after entering 
into a binding contract of sale, provide persuasive evidence that 
the trial court in the instant case committed no error in holding 
that plaintiff had no right of inspection. In Nash v. Gay Apparel 
Corp., 11 Misc.2d 768, 175 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1958), the court held 
under similar facts that the stockholder had no right to inspect 
the books and records of the corporate defendant. The plaintiff in 
Nash had contracted to sell his stock to the defendant corporation. 
At the time plaintiff made demand to inspect defendant's records, 
the stock was still registered in his name. The plaintiff sought 
to inspect the corporate books on the grounds that he was a 
corporate shareholder. In rejecting the plaintiff's demand, the 
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court held: 
It appears from the petition and the terms 
of the contract annexed thereto that 
petitioner has only a contingent interest in 
the stock which is still registered in his 
name. Under the contract petitioner sold 
his stock to the corporation. The stock is 
held in escrow pending final payment of the 
purchase price. Outside of the right to 
have the stock returned to him in the event 
of the purchaser's default, petitioner 
transferred all his rights in and to the 
stock to the corporation. Under these 
circumstances petitioner, having sold his 
stock, cannot obtain an inspection of the 
corporate records. 
While petitioner is afforded the right 
of inspection under the contract, he may not 
enforce the right by way of an Article 78, 
Civil Practice Act proceeding. 
Nash, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (citations omitted). 
A similar result was reached in Dierking v. Associated 
Books Service, Inc., 31 Misc.2d 995, 222 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1960). 
Plaintiff in Dierking sought an order permitting him to inspect 
the books and records of the defendant corporation. At the time 
of his demand, the plaintiff was under contract to sell his stock. 
The court rejected the plaintiff's demand, stating: 
The issue arises upon the alleged fact that 
the petitioner is under contract to sell the 
stock of the corporation held by him and 
that the buyer has instituted an action 
against the petitioner for specific 
performance compelling delivery of the 
certificate of stock representing the shares 
thus sold. in that action it appears that 
petitioner, as defendant, has raised a 
defense that the contract is unenforceable 
by reason of the fact that the stock must 
first be offered to the other stockholders 
of the corporation, the individual 
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respondents. The respondents, the remaining 
stockholders, have waived any right of first 
offer and consent to the sale by the 
petitioner to its contracting buyer, 
Accordingly, petitioner does not have 
such interest in any of the stock of the 
corporation as would warrant favorable 
consideration of the application, or a 
finding that it is made in good faith. The 
motion is denied. 
Dierking, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 730. See also Rosenberg v. Steinberg-
Kass, Inc., 18 Misc.2d 880, 190 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1959). 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish many of the above-cited 
authorities on the grounds that the shareholders in those cases 
had either received payment for their shares, endorsed the shares 
and delivered them to an escrow, or had sold the stock and been 
paid in full. While the cases cited herein may not be on all fours 
with the instant case, the principles enunciated in those cases 
control the resolution of this appeal. Each of the above-cited 
authorities stands for the proposition that once a shareholder 
enters into a binding contract of sale, title to the stock is 
immediately transferred from that stockholder to the purchasing 
party. 
Once a contract of sale is entered into, through the 
exercise of an option or the occurrence of some event, title to the 
stock passes and the shareholder no longer has any statutory right 
of inspection, what title or right to the stock remains in the 
shareholder is wholly inadequate to maintain a cause of action such 
as the present case. The trial court did not, therefore, err in 
finding that plaintiff had no right to inspect the books and 
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records of ROA pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §16-10-47(b). 
Plaintiff's sole right of inspection was that accorded to him 
pursuant to the appraisal clause of the parties' Agreement. 
POINT II. 
EVEN ASSUMING PLAINTIFF RETAINED HIS STATUS 
AS A SHAREHOLDER, PLAINTIFF CONTRACTED AWAY 
HIS STATUTORY RIGHT OF INSPECTION. 
The parties' Agreement provides that upon R.O.A.'s 
election to purchase plaintiff's outstanding shares that plaintiff 
is entitled to conduct an independent appraisal to determine the 
value of the corporate stock. Since this appraisal right serves 
the same purpose as the statutory right of inspection, the 
Agreement reflects the parties' intention that the contractual 
right of appraisal supersede and replace any statutory right of 
inspection. It is well established that, in the absence of an 
express statutory provision, parties may enter into contracts 
abrogating or limiting statutory provisions which confer a right or 
benefit upon one or both parties. Francam Building Corp. v. Fail, 
646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1982), appeal after remand, 687 P.2d 991 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1984) . 
Plaintiff contends that he retained his statutory right of 
inspection, despite R.O.A.'s purchase of his stock pursuant to the 
Agreement. Plaintiff asserts that every court that has ruled under 
similar circumstances has held that the shareholder retains his 
statutory right of inspection, i.e., Estate of Bishop v. Antilles 
Enterprises, Inc., 252 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1958); Knaebel v. Heiner, 
673 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1983); Shelters, Inc. v. Mankin, 130 Ga. App. 
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859, 204 S.E.2d 810 (1974); and Hoover v. Fox Rig and Lumber Co., 
199 Okla. 672, 189 P.2d 929 (1948). 
However, each of the cases relied on by plaintiff is 
incontrovertibly distinguishable from the instant case. First, the 
cited cases involve executory contracts, where the sale of the 
stock is contingent upon some discretionary act. The instant case, 
however, involves a binding bilateral contract of sale. While 
several acts, including the setting of the purchase price and 
delivery of the stock, remain to be performed in the future, R.O.A. 
has irrevocably bound itself to purchase plaintiff's stock. 
Second, none of the cited cases involve purchase contracts with 
accompanying rights of appraisal. Whereas the cited cases involved 
various contracts to purchase stock dependent upon the parties' 
negotiating and agreeing on a sales price, the purchase price of 
plaintiff's stock was to be set by independent appraisal. Pursuant 
to the Agreement, once the appraisal process is completed, R.O.A. 
is bound to pay whatever value is placed on the stock by the 
appraisal. R.O.A. has no power to revoke its purchase if it 
disagrees with the results of the appraisal. 
Following R.O.A.'s purchase of plaintiff's stock, the 
parties intended that the stock's value be determined in accordance 
with the parties' Agreement. It would be totally inconsistent with 
the terms of the Agreement to find that the parties contemplated 
that plaintiff would be allowed not only his rights of appraisal, 
but also the rights accorded him under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) 
(1953). The only reasonable interpretation of the Agreement is 
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that corporation. It is undisputed that plaintiff had previously 
reviewed, both personally and by his accountant, the same books and 
records of R.O.A. he now seeks to inspect- The plaintiff's failure 
to demand a formal statutory inspection of the corporate records 
prior to R.O.A.fs election to purchase his stock suggests strongly 
that the plaintiff's demands are meant solely to vex and harass the 
defendants. Under such circumstances, courts have denied or 
severely limited the scope of the shareholder's statutory right of 
inspection. See Skouras v. Admiralty Enterprises, Inc., 386 A.2d 
674 (Del. 1978); and Foss v. Peoples Gas Light and Coal Co., 241 
111. 238, 89 N.E. 351 (1909). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Clawson v. Clayton, 3 3 Utah 266, 
93 P.2d 729, 731 (Utah 1908), recognized the right of a corporation 
to refuse a stockholder inspection when the demand is unreasonable 
or for an improper purpose: 
When a demand is made which, under the cir-
cumstances, is unreasonable, and is sought to 
be exercised in an unreasonable manner, or for 
illegitimate reasons, the corporation may 
refuse it. 
It is clear from Clawson that a shareholder must demand inspection 
at reasonable times which would not unnecessarily impede or 
interfere with the ongoing operation of the corporation. See 
Holmes v. Bishop, 75 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011 (1930); and Goddard v. 
General Reduction and Chemical Co., 57 Utah 180, 193 P. 1103 
(1920). In addition, a demand to inspect a corporation's books and 
records may be properly denied if the needed information is 
available in other, less inconvenient, ways. See Annot., 15 
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A.L.R.2d 11, 45 (1951). The parties' Agreement provides that an 
appraisal will be conducted by a third party to determine the value 
of the stock. There is, therefore, no apparent reason for 
plaintiff to burden R.O.A. with multiple inspections, unless the 
inspections are directly related to the appraisal process. 
Defendants maintain that the only reason plaintiff is demanding to 
review R.O.A.'s records pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) is 
to harass and vex defendants, and thereby obtain some advantage in 
arriving at a favorable sale price for his stock. This is clearly 
not a proper purpose and should not be sanctioned by this Court. 
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff properly invoked his 
statutory right of inspection, plaintiff's demands have been 
unreasonable. Unreasonable demands or demands exercised in an 
unreasonable manner may be refused by R.O.A. Defendants submit 
that the records and books of R.O.A. contain various trade secrets 
and other information, which if leaked or revealed to competitors, 
could severely damage the economic viability of R.O.A.'s operations. 
(R. at 288) Due to the sensitive nature of corporate records, 
courts have permitted corporations to require non-disclosure 
assurances from shareholders. In CM&M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 
A.2d 788, 794 (Del. 1982), the Delaware Supreme Court, in remanding 
an action back to the trial court, ordered that the lower court's 
judgment be modified to provide that: 
Any inspection by Carroll [the plaintiff 
shareholder] under the Trial Court's Order 
shall be contingent upon a requirement that 
neither the plaintiff nor any agent of his 
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shall disclose information obtained as a 
result of these proceedings to anyone who 
has not first made a written representation 
to the plaintiff that he is a bona fide 
prospective purchaser of Carroll's stock and 
executed an agreement of confidentiality. 
Defendants repeatedly requested that plaintiff and 
plaintiff's agents sign a confidentiality agreement prior to their 
inspection of the books and records of R.O.A. Plaintiff and 
plaintiff's agents refused. Due to the plaintiff's failure to 
agree to a condition of confidentiality surrounding his inspection 
of R.O.A. records, his demand could not be considered reasonable. 
Defendants' refusal to permit plaintiff to inspect the 
corporate records of R.O.A. was further supported by evidence that 
plaintiff on a prior occasion had taken unfair advantage of a 
corporate opportunity while serving as a director of another 
corporation. (R. at 158, 215-16) Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) 
provides that a corporation may refuse to open its books for 
inspection where the shareholder "has improperly used any 
information secured through any prior examination of the books and 
records of account, or minutes, or record of shareholders of such 
corporation or any other corporation . . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
The determination of whether a shareholder has acted 
reasonably in making demand upon a corporation to inspect its 
records is a matter more properly left to the trial court. The New 
Mexico Supreme Court in Schwartzman v. Schwartzman Packing Co., 99 
N.M. 436, 659 P.2d 888 (1983), held that a trial court has 
discretion to determine when and in what manner the right of 
examination by shareholders should be exercised. Schwartzman arose 
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when a group of minority shareholders of a closely-held family 
corporation brought suit alleging that the majority shareholders 
had engaged in oppressive and harmful conduct against the minority 
shareholders and the corporate entity. The trial court severely 
limited the minority shareholders' review of the corporate books 
and records, and refused to impose the statutory penalties for the 
corporate officers' refusal to allow the shareholders' examination. 
In affirming the lower court's action, the court stated: 
A trial court must of necessity have some 
discretion determining when and in what 
manner the right of examination should be 
exercised. Under the facts in this case, it 
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to limit examination to regular 
business hours in addition to the 222 hours 
examination which had previously been 
allowed. 
Id. at 892. 
In the instant case, defendants suggested that the 
plaintiff's inspection be conducted in such a way as to minimize 
disruption of R.O.A.'s ongoing business operations. Defendants 
suggested that the inspections take place during four-hour periods 
per day at a time amenable to both parties. Plaintiff refused. 
Due to the fact that plaintiff had the opportunity to review the 
books and records of R.O.A. over a lengthy period of time, while 
serving as a director of the corporation, the limitations 
suggested by the defendants were reasonable. 
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POINT IV, 
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS, 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST THAT PRECLUDE 
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF. 
If this court should find that plaintiff had a statutory 
right to inspect the books and records of R.O.A., numerous material 
issues of fact exist that prevent this Court from entering an ordei 
directing the trial court to grant plaintiff1s motion for partial 
summary judgment. See, Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendants respectfully submit that while the determination of 
whether plaintiff had a statutory right of inspection is a questior. 
of law, the determination of whether plaintiff requested such an 
inspection at a reasonable time and for a proper purpose, and 
whether defendants1 refusal to permit such an inspection was 
wrongful are clearly questions of fact. See, Curkendall v. United 
Federation of Correction Officers, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 935, 483 
N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (1985); and DePaula v. Memory Gardens, Inc., 
90 A.D.2d 886, 456 N.Y.S.2d 522, 524 (1982). 
The record clearly demonstrates that defendants believed 
that plaintiff's demand was not at a reasonable time nor for a 
proper purpose. Defendants repeatedly attempted to assist 
plaintiff in his attempt to review the books and records of R.O.A. 
Issues of fact remain as to whether plaintiff g~ave~adequate notice 
to defendants before demanding inspection of the R.O.A. books and 
records. Issues of fact remain as to whether the plaintiff's 
demands were reasonable due to their particular timing in relation 
to the accounting practices of R.O.A. and the availability of 
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trained help to assist in the inspection. Issues of fact remain as 
to whether the scope of the requested inspection exceeded the 
bounds of reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances in 
this case. The determination of these critical issues of material 
fact requires far more evidence and facts than appears in the 
record on appeal. Indeed, each of these material issues of fact 
should be resolved by a trier of fact, rather than by this Court on 
appeal. 
Even if plaintiff is found to have a statutory right of 
inspection, there are substantial issues of material fact as to 
whether plaintiff's demands were for a reasonable purpose. Issues 
of fact remain as to whether defendant's refusal was justified due 
to their interpretation of the parties' Agreement. Issues of fact 
remain as to whether the defendants' actions were justified due to 
the plaintiff's refusal to guarantee the confidentiality of the 
R.O.A. records. Issues of fact remain as to whether the 
defendants' refusal to permit the inspection of the R.O.A. books 
was justified due to the plaintiff's alleged prior usurpation of a 
corporate business opportunity. The record on appeal is less than 
clear as to whether the plaintiff's demand to inspect was for a 
proper purpose, as required under Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b) 
(1953). The propriety of plaintiff's demand should^ therefore, be 
resolved by a trier of fact, rather than by this Court. 
In view of the numerous substantial issues of material 
fact that exist in the record on appeal, this Court should not rule 
as a matter of law that defendants' refusal was wrongful or 
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unlawful. The determination of these issues, if necessary to the 
resolution of this dispute, should be made by the trial court. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO MULTIPLE STATUTORY 
PENALTIES FOR DEFENDANTS1 REFUSAL TO PERMIT 
ACCESS TO R.O.A.'S BOOKS AND RECORDS. 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) (1953) provides that any 
officer, agent or corporation which refuses to allow a shareholder 
to examine and make extracts from corporate books and records 
"shall be liable to such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of the 
value of the shares owned by such shareholder, in addition to any 
other damages or remedy afforded him by loss; but no penalty shall 
exceed $5,000." 
Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to an award under 
the statutory penalty provision of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(c) as a 
matter of law. In addition, plaintiff asserts that he is entitled 
to "an award of three statutory penalties" for the defendants1 
refusal on "three separate occasions . . . to allow Webb, his 
agents and attorneys, to examine and make extracts from R.O.A.'s 
books and records of account." (Appellant's Brief, p. 25) 
Plaintiff urges this court to broadly construe Utah Code 
Ann. §16-10-47(c) to permit an award of multiple statutory 
penalties for what he characterizes as three separate refusals. It 
is well established that such statutory penalty provisions are 
penal in nature, and are therefore subject to the rule of strict 
interpretation. Padovano v. Wotizky, 355 So.2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1978); and 18A Am.Jur.2d Corporations §421 (1985). Since the 
-32-
Utah statute is silent on the availability of multiple statutory 
penalty awards, this Court should rule as a matter of law that such 
multiple awards are forbidden. Assuming arguendo that multiple 
penalties are available under Utah law, the matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for a determination of how many, if 
any, refusals the defendant made. See Meyer v. Ford Industries, 
Inc., 272 Or. 531, 538 P.2d 353 (1975). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' election on January 27, 1987, to exercise its 
option of purchase divested plaintiff of his status as a 
shareholder within the scope of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b). The 
parties' Agreement provided for a binding contract of sale. Once 
the option was exercised, title to the stock transferred from 
plaintiff to defendant R.O.A. Plaintiff's demand to inspect the 
corporate records of R.O.A. in May and June, 1987, was, therefore, 
outside the scope of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-47(b). Even if 
plaintiff retained his status as a shareholder, plaintiff's 
statutory right of inspection was waived under the terms of the 
parties' Agreement. Substantial evidence exists that plaintiff's 
demand was not made at a reasonable time nor for a proper purpose. 
The reasonableness and appropriateness of plaintiff's demand 
necessarily involve substantial issues of fact that preclude the 
entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of plaintiff on 
appeal. Even if the defendants' refusal was wrongful or unlawful, 
Utah law precludes the awarding of multiple statutory penalties 
against defendants as a matter of law. 
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Defendants, therefore, respectfully request that the 
judgment of the trial court granting partial summary judgment in 
favor of defendants be affirmed 
1988 
. -^  
DATED this \*H day of \ ^J>\1 
STRONG & HANNI -A 
By _ _ 
PHILIP R. FISHLER 
DENNIS M. ASTILL 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Reagan 
DOUGLAS T. HALL 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
R.O.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent were hand delivered this day ot 
gt_, 1988, to the following: 
CAROL GOODMAN, Esq. 
VAL J. CHRISTENSEN, Esq. 
VICTORIA E. BRIEANT, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
LEBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MACRAE 
136 South Main Street, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 # 
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ADDENDUM 
- 3 5 -
Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-2(15) (1953) 
(15) "Shareholder" means one who is a 
holder of record of shares in a corporation• 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-47(b) and (c) (1953) 
(b) Any person who is a shareholder of 
record, upon written demand stating the purpose 
thereof, shall have the right to examine, in 
person, or by agent or attorney, at any reasonable 
time or times, for any proper purpose, its books 
and records of account, minutes and record of 
shareholders and to make extracts therefrom. A 
proper purpose means a propose reasonably related 
to the personfs interest as a shareholder, 
(c) Any officer or agent who, or a corporation 
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, 
or his agent or attorney, so to examine and make 
extracts from its books and records of account, 
minutes, and record of shareholders, for any 
proper purpose, shall be liable to such share-
holder in a penalty of 10% of the value of the 
shares owned by such shareholder, in addition to 
any other damages or remedy afforded him by law; 
but no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. It shall 
be a defense to any action for penalties under 
this section that the person suing therefor has 
within two years sold or offered for sale any 
list of shareholders of such corporation or any 
other corporation or has aided or abetted any 
person in procuring any list of shareholders for 
any such purpose, or has improperly used any 
information secured through any prior examination 
of the books and records of account, or minutes, 
or record of shareholders of such corporation or 
any other corporation, or was not acting in good 
faith or for a proper purpose in making his demand. 
A-l 
January 27, 1987 
CERTIFIED MAIL and 
HAND DELIVERED 
Mr. Roland Webb and 
Mrs. Bessie P. Webb 
1837 Baywood Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Dear Roland and Bessie: 
This letter is to notify you that R.O.A. General, Inc. is hereby 
exercising its option under paragraph 11 of that Agreement by and 
between William K. Reagan, Roland Webb, Bessie P. Webb and R.O.A. 
General, Inc. to purchase all of the R.O.A. General, Inc. stock 
owned by the two of you. 
At your earliest convenience, we should meet to discuss 
information which I have concerning the value of the R.O.A. 
General, Inc. stock. Also, we need to discuss the other aspects 
of the transaction. 
Very truly yours, 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. 
WKR/so 
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Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. • 1775 North 900 West • Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 • (801) 521-1 
Exhibit 
1 
AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made this _/ day of July, 1981, by and 
among WILLIAM K. REAGAN, hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
"Reagan" and ROLAND WEBB and BESSIE P. WEBB, hereinafter sometimes 
collectively referred to as "Webb", all of the above hereinafter 
sometimes referred to collectively as "the Stockholders" and each 
singly as "Stockholder", and R.O.A. General, Inc., d/b/a Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred to as 
"the Corporation", 
Recitals: 
A, The Stockholders, as incorporators, will organize a 
corporation under the laws of the State of Utah, the Corporation, 
for the purpose of engaging in operating an outdoor advertising 
business, including the borrowing of money for such purpose, and to 
engage in any other lawful business activity. 
B. The Stockholders will own all of the outstanding common 
stock of the Corporation, hereinafter, including any such stock 
issued hereafter, referred to as the "Stock," 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises 
herein contained and for other good and valuable consideration, the 
parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Sale of Stock. Reagan hereby agrees to sell to Webb 
shares of stock of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. The amount of 
stock shall be determined based upon the relative net worth of 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc. on the date the Corporation purchases the stock of Galaxy 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. which is not owned by Webb, hereinafter 
referred to as "Closing Date". It has been agreed that the value of 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. is $3,163,202 plus the amount of 
cash, prepaid expenses, and the value of notes and accounts 
receivables as of the Closing Date minus all liabilities at the 
Closing Date, and the value of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. is 
$5,100,000 plus the amount of cash, prepaid expenses, and the value 
A-3 
of notes and accounts receivables as of the Closing Date minus all 
liabilities, excluding deferred income taxes, at the Closing Date. 
Current assets and liabilities of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
and Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. shall be determined using 
consistent accounting principles. The value of the stock to be 
purchased by Webb shall be the difference between (i) the value of 
Webb's stock in Galaxy Advertising, Inc. minus $255,727 divided by 
20 percent; and (ii) the total value of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc. and Webb's stock in Galaxy Advertising, Inc. The purchase 
price shall be paid by a demand promissory note with interest at the 
rate provided in paragraph 12.2(c) (ii). Provided, however, Reagan 
shall not be required to sell stock that would result in his owning 
less than 66-2/3 percent of the sto.ck of the Corporation. 
2. Subscription for Stock. 
2.1 Stock Issued to Reagan. In exchange for all of 
the shares of stock of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. owned by 
Reagan, after making the sale as provided in paragraph 1 above, 
the Corporation shall issue to Reagan such shares that his 
percentage ownership of the outstanding stock of the Corporation 
shall equal the percentage determined by dividing (i) the value 
of the Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. stock, as defined in 
paragraph 1, being contributed; by (ii) the total value of 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and the value of Webb's stock 
of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., as defined in paragraph 1. 
2.2 Stock Issued to Webb. In exchange for all of the 
shares of stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. owned by Webb, after making the 
purchase as provided in paragraph 1 above, the Corporation shall 
issue to Webb such shares that his percentage ownership of the 
outstanding stock of the Corporation shall equal the percentage 
determined by dividing (i) the value of the Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. stock and the Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
stock, as defined in paragraph 1, being contributed; by (ii) the 
total value of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and the value of 
"
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Webb's stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., as defined in 
paragraph 1. 
3. Pledge of Stock. No Stockholder shall, at any time, 
transfer any*of his or her stock to any person other than the 
Corporation, or a corporation which is a member of an affiliated 
group, as amended, which includes the Corporation, hereinafter 
referred to as a "Subsidiary", as security for any loan or other 
obligation unless such Stockholder shall first obtain the written 
consent of the holders of at least a majority of the Stock then 
outstanding, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. In 
the event stock is pledged to the Corporation or a Subsidiary, such 
pledgee shall be subject to paragraph 5 of this Agreement in the 
event of any sale of such Stock by-such pledgee. 
4. Gifts of Stock. No Stockholder shall transfer any of 
his or her Stock other than for a valuable consideration (in which 
event such transfer shall be subject to the provisions of either 
paragraph 3 or 5 hereof) to any person other than (i) the 
Corporation, or (ii) a Stockholder's spouse, one or more of his or 
her lineal descendants, or a trust of which the foregoing or any of 
them are the primary beneficiaries and such person(s) has agreed in 
a writing filed with the Secretary of the Corporation prior to such 
transfer to be bound by all the terms of this Agreement in all 
respects as though such person were originally a party hereto, 
unless such Stockholder shall first obtain the written consent to 
such transfer of the holders of a majority of the Stock then 
outstanding, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
5. Rights of First Refusal Upon Any Sale of Stock. 
5.1 Notice of Intended Transfer. Any Stockholder who 
intends to transfer any of his or her Stock for a valuable 
consideration to any person other than the Corporation (as 
hereinafter defined) shall give seventy (70) days' prior written 
notice of such intended transfer, hereinafter referred to as 
"the Notice", to the Corporation and to each Stockholder. The 
Notice, in addition to stating the fact of the intention so to 
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transfer such Stock, shall state (i) the number of shares of 
Stock to be transferred, (ii) the name, business and residence 
address of the proposed transferee, and (iii) the amount or 
market value of the consideration, hereinafter referred to as 
the "Price", and all other terms of the intended transfer. 
5.2 Primary Options to Purchase. At any time within 
thirty (30) days after receipt of the Notice by the Corporation, 
the Corporation shall have the option to purchase all of the 
Stock described in the Notice for the Price and upon terms not 
less favorable to the Corporation than those granted the 
proposed transferee. Provided, however, if the proposed 
transfer would not result in the recognition of gain for income 
tax purposes, the price shall "be increased to include the amount 
of tax liability the Stockholder would recognize upon the 
exercise of the Option. Such option shall be exercisable by the 
Corporation giving the transferring Stockholder, prior to the 
expiration of said thirty (30) day period, a written notice of 
its exercise of its option with respect to all of the Stock 
described in the Notice. If the Corporation does not exercise 
the option, it shall, not later than five (5) days after the 
expiration of said thirty (30) day period, advise each 
Stockholder (other than the transferring Stockholder) of the 
date on which the Corporation received the Notice and of that 
such option was not so exercised by the Corporation? provided, 
however, that any failure or delay of the Corporation in giving 
such advice to such Stockholders shall not in any way affect the 
options of such Stockholders with respect to such Stock. 
Any time within sixty (60) days after receipt of the 
Notice by the Corporation, each Stockholder then holding Stock 
(other than the transferring Stockholder) shall have the option 
to purchase, for the Price and upon terms not less favorable to 
such Stockholder than those granted the proposed transferee, all 
or any portion of that proportion of the Stock described in the 
Notice with respect to which the Corporation has not exercised 
-4-
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its option which equals the proportion which the number of 
shares of Stock owned by such Stockholder at the time of receipt 
of the Notice by the Corporation is of the total number of 
shares of Stock then owned by all such Stockholders. Each such 
option shall be exercisable by the exercising Stockholder giving 
the transferring Stockholder and the Corporation, prior to the 
expiration of said sixty (60) day period, a written notice of 
their exercise of such option. 
The options granted under this paragraph 5.2 are 
sometimes hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Primary 
Options" and singly as the "Primary Option". 
5.3 Secondary Options to Purchaser. If, upon the 
expiration of sixty (60) days'after receipt of the Notice by the 
Corporation, the Primary Options have not been exercised as 
hereinabove provided with respect to all of the Stock described 
in the Notice, each Stockholder who has theretofore exercised 
his or her Primary Option as to all Stock which was subject 
thereto shall have the further, option to purchase, for the Price 
and upon terms not less favorable to such Stockholder than those 
granted the proposed transferee, any shares of the Stock 
described in the Notice with respect to which the Primary 
Options were not exercised, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Secondary Option Shares". Such further options are hereinafter 
sometimes referred to collectively as the "Secondary Options" 
and singly as the "Secondary Option". 
If, under the foregoing provisions of this paragraph 
5.3, only one Stockholder shall have a Secondary Option, then 
such Secondary Option shall be exercisable with respect to all 
or any portion of the number of Secondary Option Shares which 
bears the same proportion to the total number of such Secondary 
Option Shares as the number of shares of such Stock owned at the 
time of receipt by the Corporation of the Notice by each 
Stockholder having a Secondary Option bears to the total number 
of shares of such Stock then owned by all Stockholders having a 
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Secondary Option; provided, however, that all such Stockholders 
having a Secondary Option may by agreement among themselves 
determine the proportions in which some or all of them may 
exercise^their respective Secondary Options. 
Each Secondary Option shall be exercisable by the 
exercising Stockholder giving the transferring Stockholder and 
the Corporation a written notice of such exercise at any time 
within seventy (70) days after receipt of the Notice by the 
Corporation. 
5.4 Condition of Exercise of Primary and Secondary 
Options. A condition precedent to the exercise of the Primary 
and Secondary Options shall be that all Stock being offered for 
transfer must be purchased pursuant to the exercise of the 
Primary and Secondary Options. 
5.5 Transfer After Termination of Options. Any Stock 
with respect to which none of the options hereinabove provided 
for has been exercised may be transferred by the transferring 
Stockholder to the proposed transferee free of any rights or 
duties created by this Agreement'provided that such transfer is 
completed upon the same terms specified in the Notice within 
ninety (90) days after receipt of the Notice by the Corporation. 
If for any reason said transfer is not so completed within said 
ninety (90) day period, then the transferring Stockholder may 
not thereafter transfer any such Stock without giving a new 
Notice as provided in paragraph 5.1 hereof, in which event such 
Stock shall again become subject to all of the options 
hereinabove provided for. Provided, however, if Reagan proposes 
to transfer Stock representing 50 percent or more of the Stock 
of the Corporation and options hereinabove provided have not 
been exercised, prior to the transfer of such Stock, Reagan 
shall provide that Webb's Stock can be transferred, at Webb's 
option, on the same terms and conditions. 
5.6 If the transferring Stockholder
 xdies within the 
seventy (70) days period referred to in paragraph 5.1 of this 
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Agreement, the provisions of paragraphs 6,1 through 7.2 of this 
Agreement, inclusive, shall become applicable to all Stock owned 
by such transferring Stockholder other than Stock, if any, 
subject to an option under this paragraph 5 which has been 
exercised pursuant to the terms of this Agreement prior to the 
death of such Stockholder. 
6. Options and Transfers After Death of Reagan. 
6.1 Upon the death of Reagan, at the election of 
Reagan's personal representative, the Corporation shall be 
required to purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Reagan at 
the time of his death, as hereinafter provided, if all of the 
following conditions precedent have been or are concurrently 
satisfied: 
(a) This Agreement continues in effect and has 
not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15. 
(b) Within a reasonable time after the death of 
Reagan but within nine (9) months an authorized 
representative (being one or more persons having 
responsibility to file a return to pay Federal estate tax) 
makes an application in writing either to the Board of 
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the 
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this 
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be 
redeemed. 
6.2 All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 6 
shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
7. Options and Tranfers after Death of Webb. 
7.1 Upon the death of Webb, at the election of Webb's 
personal representative, the Corporation shall be required to 
purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Webb at such time, as 
hereinafter provided, if all of the following conditions 
precedent have been or are concurrently satisfied: 
(a) This Agreement continues in effect and has 
not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15. 
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(b) Within a reasonable time after the death of 
Webb, but within nine (9) months an authorized 
representative of Webb (being one or more persons having 
responsibility to file a return to pay Federal estate tax) 
makes an application in writing either to the Board of 
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the 
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this 
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be 
redeemed, 
7.2 All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 7 
shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
8. Options and Transfers After August 1, 1981. 
8.1 At any time after August 1, 1981 the Corporation 
shall have the option to purchase such amount of stock owned by 
Webb that would reduce his ownership of the outstanding stock of 
the Corporation to 20 percent, or such additional stock as is 
necessary to cause the redemption to qualify as a sale or 
exchange under Section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, but 
not less than such amount. Such*option shall be exercisable by 
giving Webb written notice of such exercise. Provided, however, 
the Corporation may only exercise such option if such redemption 
qualifies as a sale or exchange under Section 302(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
8.2 All redemptions of stock under this paragraph 8 
shall be upon terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
9. Options and Transfers After August 1, 1986 and 
Thereafter. 
9.1 On August 1, 1986, and on August 1 in each 
succeeding year at the election of Webb, the Corporation shall 
be required to purchase as much as 20 percent of the Stock, 
owned by Webb on August 1, 1986, or such additional Stock as may 
be necessary to qualify such redemption as a sale or exchange 
under Section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, as 
hereinafter provided, if all of the following conditions 
precedent have been or are concurrently satisfied: 
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(a) This Agreement continues in effect and has 
not been terminated as provided in paragraph 15, 
(b) Within five months after such date, Webb 
makes an application in writing either to the Board of 
Directors of the Corporation or to any one or more of the 
officers of the Corporation for benefits under this 
paragraph and tenders to the Corporation the Stock to be 
redeemed. 
9.2 All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 9 
shall be upon terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
10. Options Upon Death of Webb. 
10.1 Upon the death of Webb the Corporation shall 
have the option to purchase all .but not less than all the Stock 
owned by Webb at such time of his death. Such option shall be 
exercisable by giving his personal representative written notice 
of such exercise at any time within six (6) months after the 
date of his death. If the Corporation does not so exercise its 
option, the Corporation shall, not later than five (5) days 
after the expiration of said six (6) month period, advise each 
Stockholder that such option was not so exercised by the 
Corporation; provided, however, that any failure or delay of the 
Corporation in giving such advice to such Stockholders shall not 
in any way affect the options of such Stockholders with respect 
to such Stock. 
At any time within sixty (60) days, with respect to a 
Primary Option, or seventy (70) days, with respect to a 
Secondary Option, after receipt of the Notice by the 
Corporation, each Stockholder shall have a Primary Option and, 
if applicable, a Secondary Option to purchase all or any portion 
of the Stock described in the Notice with respect to which the 
Corporation has not exercised its option, which Primary Options 
and Secondary Options shall be exercisable in the same manner 
and proportions as, and subject to the same ter^ms and 
conditions, provided for in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 of this 
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Agreement except that (i) all notices of the exercise of any 
such option shall be given to his personal representative, (ii) 
the time periods for exercising such options shall be measured 
by reference to the time of receipt by the Corporation of the 
Notice hereinabove referred to, (iii) the "Price" shall in each 
instance, be the market value of the Stock with respect to which 
the partiuclar option has been exercised. 
10.2 All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 10 
shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
11. Options Upon August 1, 1986 and Thereafter. 
11.1 At August 1, 1986 and on such date in each 
succeeding year the Corporation shall have the option to 
purchase all or part of the Stock owned by Webb on such date, 
provided the Corporation must purchase sufficient Stock to have 
the redemption qualify as an exchange under section 302(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. Such option 
shall be exercisable by giving Webb written notice of such 
exercise at any time within six (6) months after such date. If 
the Corporation does not so exercise its option, the Corporation 
shall, not later than five (5) days after the expiration of said 
six (6) month period, advise each Stockholder of the date on 
which the Corporation that such option was not so exercised by 
the Corporation; provided, however, that any failure or delay of 
the Corporation in giving such advice to such Stockholders shall 
not in any way affect the options of such Stockholders with 
respect to such Stock. 
At any time within sixty (60) days, with respect to a 
Primary Option, or seventy (70) days, with respect to a 
Secondary Option, after receipt of the Notice by the 
Corporation, each Stockholder shall have a Primary Option and, 
if applicable, a Secondary Option to purchase all or any portion 
of the Stock described in the Notice with respect to which the 
Corporation has not exercised its option, which Primary Options 
and Secondary Options shall be exercisable in the same manner 
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and proportions as, and subject to the same terms and 
conditions, provided for in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 of this 
Agreement except that (i) all notices of the exercise of any 
such option shall be given to his personal representative, (ii) 
the time periods for exercising such options shall be measured 
by reference to the time of receipt by the Corporation of the 
Notice hereinabove referred to, (iii) the "Price" shall in each 
instance, be the market value of the Stock with respect to which 
the partiuclar option has been exercised. 
11.2 All redemptions of Stock under this paragraph 11 
shall be upon the terms and conditions provided in paragraph 12. 
12• Terms and Conditions of Purchase. 
12.1 Purchase Price. The purchase price of each 
share of stock shall be the fair market value of the stock on 
the date of purchase determined as follows: 
The Stockholder who offers to sell his stock, or 
the personal representatives of a decedent Stockholder, 
shall appoint an appraiser to appraise the value of the 
Stock. If the other parties hereto do not agree to the 
appraisal of such appraiser, such other parties shall 
appoint a second appraiser to appraise the Stock, The 
average of the two appraisals so obtained shall be used in 
determining the fair market value of the Stock, if the 
higher of the two appraisals is no more than 105 percent of 
the lower of the two appraisals; otherwise, the two 
appraisers shall appoint a third appraiser, and any 
appraisal agreed to by two of the three appraisers shall be 
binding on the parties hereto absent fraud. All appraisals 
shall be based on the normal operations of the 
Corporation. The Corporation shall pay the costs of the 
appraisals. If the Stock is purchased under this Agreement 
pursuant to options under paragraphs 10 or 11, and within 
one year of such purchase Reagan sells his stock, the 
purchase price and terms for the stock being purchased 
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shall be adjusted so as to be equal to the price and terms 
at which Reagan sold his stock, 
12.2 Payment of Purchase Price. 
(a) In the event the stock being purchased is 
being purchased upon the death of a Stockholder under 
paragraph 6, the purchase price shall be paid in cash or 
upon such other terms as may be agreed to by the parties, 
(b) In the event the stock is being purchased 
pursuant to the exercise of the option under paragraph 8, 
the purchase price shall be paid with a demand promissory 
note which shall bear interest at the rate provided in 
paragraph (c) (ii) below. 
(c) In the event the stock is being purchased 
pursuant to the exercise of options under paragraphs 9 or 
11, the purchase price shall be paid 
(i) In cash; 
(ii) In 120 equal monthly payments together 
with accrued interest with the first such payment due 
one month from the date the option is exercised. The 
interest rate shall be determined annually for 
payments due for one year following the date of 
adjustment and shall be equal to two percentage points 
over the average rate for United States Treasury Bonds 
with a 10-year maturity date for the period 15 days 
before and 15 days after the date the option was 
exercised, or for subsequent years, the anniversary 
date of such exercise. All amounts due may be prepaid 
without penalty. Provided, however, if payments are 
due under this paragraph and Reagan sells his stock in 
a transaction that is not a reorganization under 
Section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as 
amended, the payments due under this paragraph shall 
thereafter, at the option of Webb, be on the same 
payment due and terms of such sale; or 
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(iii) Upon such other terms as may be agreed 
to by the parties. 
(d) In the event the stock is being purchased 
pursuant, to the exercise of options under paragraphs 7 or 10, 
the purchase price shall be paid 
(i) In cash; 
(ii) A down payment equal to the federal estate 
tax imposed on the value of the stock included in Webb's 
estate for federal estate tax purposes based on the average 
tax rate imposed on such estate. The balance shall be paid 
as provided in paragraph (c)(ii) above; or 
(iii) Upon such other terms as may be agreed to by 
the parties. 
13. Legend on Certificates. All Stock whether now owned 
or hereafter acquired by any party to this Agreement shall be 
subject to the provisions of this Agreement, and all certificates 
representing the Stock shall bear the following legend: 
The shares represented by this Certificate are subject to and 
transferable only on compliance with an Agreement dated 
between the Corporation and its 
shareholders, a copy of which is on file at the offices of the 
Corporation. 
14. Voting Agreement. 
14.1 Voting Agreement Until August 1, 1986. The 
Stockholders hereby agree to vote their Stock at all meetings of 
the Stockholders until August 1, 1986, the death of Roland Webb 
or Reagan, or the termination of this Agreement under paragraph 
15 whichever is sooner, as follows: 
(a) To elect Reagan, Norm Clark, or such other 
person that is designated by Reagan, Webb, Duanne C. 
Karren, or such other person that is designated by Webb, 
and Gerald Gray, or such other person that is mutually 
agreed upon by Reagan and Webb as members of the Board of 
Directors. All transactions between the Corporation and a 
Shareholder, except as provided in (b) (c\ and (d) below, 
shall be subject to approval by such Board of Directors. 
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(b) To have the Corporation enter into 
employment agreements with Reagan and Webb upon the terms 
set out in the agreements attached hereto as Exhibits A and 
B. 
(c) To have the Corporation sell real property, 
more particularly described on Exhibit C attached hereto, 
to Webb Investment for $548,310. 
(d) To have the Corporation lease real property, 
more particularly described on Exhibit D attached hereto, 
under a lease substantially the same as Exhibit E, attached 
hereto, 
14.2 Voting Agreement After August 1, 1986. The 
Stockholders hereby agree to vote their stock at all meetings of 
the Stockholders after August 1, 1986 to elect Roland Webb as a 
director so long as he owns Stock or until the death of Roland 
Webb or Reagan or the termination of this Agreement. 
15. Termination. This Agreement and all rights and 
duties provided for hereunder shall terminate upon the occurrence of 
any of the following events: 
(a) The bankruptcy or dissolution of the Corporation; 
(b) A single Stockholder becoming the owner of all 
Stock of the Corporation which is then subject to this Agreement; 
(c) Execution of a written instrument by the holders 
of all of the Stock outstanding which terminates this Agreement. 
The termination of this Agreement for any reason shall not 
affect any right or remedy existing hereunder prior to the effective 
date of such termination. 
16. Rights of Ownership. The Stockholders shall retain 
all their rights as stockholders of the Corporation, except those 
specifically modified by this Agreement. 
17. Subchapter S Election. 
17.1 It is the desire and intention of the 
Corporation and each of the Stockholders that the Corporation 
should make a Subchapter S election under the United States 
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Internal Revenue Code 1954, as amended, and should terminate and 
revoke any such election once made only in accordance with the 
determination of the holders of a majority of all the 
outstanding stock of the Corporation. 
17.2 In order to protect any Subchapter S election 
made by the Corporation and to prevent its inadvertent 
termination by transfer of any stock of the Corporation into the 
hands of more than fifteen shareholders or an unqualified or 
nonconsenting shareholder, the Stockholders, intending to 
legally bind themselves, their successors, executors, 
administrators, heirs and assigns, hereby agree as follows; and 
agree that they will vote their shares, execute necessary 
documents, take other required action, and otherwise exert their 
best efforts at all times in good faith to accomplish the 
following objectives: 
(a) If the holders of a majority of all 
outstanding stock of- the Corporation at any time determine 
that it will be in the best interest of the Corporation and 
its shareholders to make an election, or to terminate or 
revoke an election, under Subchapter S of the United States 
Internal Revenue Code, (i) the Corporation agrees that it 
will make such election by timely filing of Form 2553 or 
other appropriate form and supporting documents, and to 
terminate or revoke such election and (ii) the Stockholders 
agree that each will give his written consent thereto in 
such form and manner and execute all documents and take 
such other action as may be necessary or adviseable to 
effectuate such determination. If any document evidencing 
such consent or other action is required for filing or 
other purposes under the provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code or otherwise in order to effectuate such 
determination, and any shareholder is unable or otherwise 
fails to execute such document or take such other action in 
due and timely manner, then Stockholder hereby appoints the 
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Secretary of the Corporation to be his attorney-in-fact to 
execute such document and to take all other action in his 
place and stead which may be necessary or advisable to 
effectuate such determination, 
(b) No Stockholder will sellr assign or transfer 
any of his shares of the Corporation to any person or in 
any manner which would cause a Subchapter S election 
theretofore made by the Corporation to be terminated or 
revoked, without the prior consent by vote or in writing of 
the holders of a majority in interest of all the 
outstanding stock of the Corporation. 
18. Notices. All notices provided for by this Agreement 
shall be made in writing either by actual delivery of the notice 
into the hands of the party entitled thereto or by mailing the 
notice in the United States mails to the last known address as shown 
on the records of the Corporation, of the party entitled thereto, 
certified mail, return receipt requested. In either case, such 
notice shall be deemed to be given and received upon its actual 
receipt by the party entitled thereto. 
19. Closing Date. The Closing Date shall be August 1, 
1981. 
20. Condition Precedent. The obligations of all the 
parties to this Agreement are subject to the Closing of the purchase 
by the Corporation of at least eighty percent of the outstanding 
stock of Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
21. Genearl Provisions. 
21.1 Remedies for Breach. The Stock is a unique 
chattel and each party to this Agreement shall have the remedies 
which are available to him, her or it for the violation of any 
of the terms of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, 
the equitable remedy of specific performance. 
21.2 Descriptive Headings. Titles to paragraphs are 
for information purposes only. 
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21.3 Successors, etc. Except as hereinabove 
expressly provided otherwise, this Agreement shall bind and 
inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective 
heirs, distributees, executors, administrators, successors 
(including, without limitations, guardians, conservators, or 
trustees in bankruptcy) and assigns; but nothing herein shall be 
construed as an authorization of any party to assign or delegate 
his rights or obligations hereunder. Each Stockholder by the 
signing hereof directs his or her personal representative to 
open their estates promptly in the courts of proper jurisdiction 
and to execute, procure and deliver all documents, including, 
but not limited to, appropriate orders of court, and estate and 
inheritance tax waivers, as may be required to effectuate the 
purposes of this Agreement. 
21.4 Invalid Provision, The invalidity or 
unenforceability of any particular provision of this Agreement 
shall not affect the other provisions hereof, and the Agreement 
shall be construed in all respects as if such invalid or 
unenforceable provisions were 'omitted. 
21.5 Governing Law, This Agreement shall be 
construed pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah then in 
effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Agreement as of the day and year first above written. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC 
Attest: 
Secretary 
^ 
William K. ReaganN^ // 
* Roland Webb 
Bessie P. Webb 
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